Foreign Direct Investment by Kenneth A. Froot
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Foreign Direct Investment
Volume Author/Editor: Kenneth A. Froot, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-26621-4
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/froo93-1
Conference Date: May 15, 1992
Publication Date: January 1993
Chapter Title: Introduction to "Foreign Direct Investment"
Chapter Author: Kenneth A. Froot
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6531
Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 12)Introduction 
Kenneth A. Froot 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown dramatically as a major form of 
international capital transfer over the past decade. Between 1980 and 1990, 
world flows of FDI-defined  as cross-border expenditures to acquire or ex- 
pand corporate control of productive assets-have  approximately tripled. FDI 
has become a major form of  net international borrowing for Japan and the 
United States (the world’s largest international lender and borrower, respec- 
tively). Direct investment has grown even more rapidly of late within Europe. 
To  what extent is this sudden worldwide surge in FDI explained by tradi- 
tional theories? These theories predict the scale and scope of  multinational 
enterprises by looking to differences in competitive advantage, across firms or 
countries, that might lead to the extension of corporate control across borders. 
So, for example, better technology, management capability, and product de- 
sign; stronger consumer allegiance; and greater complementarities  in produc- 
tion or use of technology can allow a domestic firm to control foreign assets 
more productively than would a foreign firm and could therefore predicate 
direct investment. In many  cases, these theories also explain why an enter- 
prise’s  alternatives to  FDI-domestically  based production or licensing of 
foreign-based production-are  less efficient than direct control of  foreign- 
based operations (see, e.g., Caves 1982; Vernon 1966). 
Traditional theories are very useful for explaining basic long-term patterns 
of FDI. For example, they help understand the behavior of U.S. firms during 
the post-World  War I1 period (the experience on which these theories were 
honed). At that time, advanced U.S. firms were superior in technology and 
well established in foreign markets. U.S. firms tended to move overseas to 
retain competitive access (or to preempt competitors’ access) to those markets 
and, in the process, met with relatively little competition. 
These theories also help us understand why the tide of U.S. FDI flows has 
slowly turned. The evolution of the United States from a home for domestically 
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based multinationals to a host for foreign-based multinationals is probably the 
single most obvious sign of change in FDI today. This development basically 
coincides with the waning (and even disappearance) of  U.S. firms’ former 
competitive advantages. It is obvious to today’s consumer that European-, Jap- 
anese, and Canadian-based firms have developed advantages that allow them 
to control certain assets in the United States more efficiently than would U.S.- 
based firms. 
In spite of their successes, however, the traditional theories leave many re- 
cent features of  FDI unexplained. First, it is hard to believe that the tide of 
underlying competitive advantage followed closely (or at all) the behavior of 
total FDI flows over the last decade: very rapid increases from 1979 through 
1981, strong declines from 1982 through 1985, and then increases of unprece- 
dented size from  1986 through  1990. One would have  expected changes in 
national competitive advantages to be reflected in more steady trends. Second, 
to the extent that any developments happen quickly, one might have expected 
that they would occur in a single industry at a time-say,  the automobile pro- 
ducers of  Japan-as  shocks to competitive ability come to be reflected in 
world ownership patterns. Yet the surges of  the past fifteen years take place 
across virtually all industries simultaneously. 
The recent FDI surges in U.S. inflows and Japanese outflows illustrate these 
two  features. Japanese FDI overall, which historically was small, exploded 
across all industries in the latest surge, experiencing in the aggregate a seven- 
fold increase from  1985 to  1989. During this surge, both U.S. inflows and 
Japanese outflows were particularly large and fast-growing in real estate and 
financial services. In these industries, however, there was little evidence of 
meaningful change in competitive advantage. Particularly puzzling is the case 
of Japanese banks, which during the latest surge went on a much-publicized 
binge in acquiring foreign affiliates. Many of the involved banks were actually 
noted for their apparently inefficient operations and low profitability in com- 
parison with U.S. and European companies. These facts suggest that existing 
theories do a good job of explaining neither the timing or magnitude of surges 
nor their broad cross-industry composition. 
Another group of theories, less well established, may help us understand the 
timing and cross-sectional behavior of surges. Tax changes may have had sud- 
den, large (sometimes unintended) across-the-board effects on the relative 
(foreign versus domestic) profitability of  asset control. Such effects are un- 
likely to be sustained for decades. 
Changes in corporate borrowing capacity and availability of internal funds 
may  also help explain why some firms can invest or purchase assets more 
“cheaply” than others can even without a perceptible change in competitive 
advantage. Follow-the-leader tendencies, even if not completely rational, may 
influence corporate location decisions in the short run (although in the long 
run such decisions will presumably be more consistent with the underlying 
economics of production). Strategically oriented location decisions (in goods 3  Introduction 
and factor markets which display imperfect competition) might be driven by 
conjectures about other firms’ propensity to invest abroad and might therefore 
lead to rational herdlike behavior. Actual or existing trade barriers are also an 
important consideration (and are also stressed by more traditional theories). 
The essays in this volume assess these newer explanations as well as other, 
older theories. The chapters are grouped in order to attack the issue from a 
variety of  perspectives. The first group comprises overview essays (by Paul 
Krugman and Monty Graham, Rachel McCulloch, and Raymond Vernon) that 
look at the broad FDI experience during the most recent period and contrast it 
with earlier trends. The papers define the main issues and areas of change in 
FDI patterns and assess the performance of macrotheories. The second group 
deals with specific-country experiences. There are essays on Japan (Robert 
Lawrence), on the United States (Robert Lipsey), and on East Asian devel- 
oping countries (Louis Wells). One chapter analyzes the FDI experience along 
a different dimension, evaluating how the developments within a specific in- 
dustry-semiconductors-match  up with those seen on a country or world- 
wide basis (David Yoffie). 
Another important characteristic of recent FDI is the mode by  which it is 
accomplished. In the past, greenfield investment was the rule, but today the 
vast majority of FDI  is done through mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Why 
the sudden change? Older theories say little about the mechanics of FDI trans- 
actions; perhaps changes in financing technologies made acquisitions easier 
and resulted in a surge in M&A (domestic as well as foreign). 
The growth in international merger and acquisition transactions has led re- 
searchers to study M&A on its own terms. One advantage of looking at acqui- 
sitions data is that purchase prices are flexible and, because they often are the 
result of competitive bidding, are meaningful as well. By contrast, the “costs” 
of doing greenfield investment are rarely recorded and rarely reflect the invest- 
or’s eagerness to proceed. By analyzing M&A transactions, we can learn some- 
thing about foreign investors’ reservation prices and can compare them with 
the reservation prices of domestic investors. This can give us another indepen- 
dent measure of the propensity of foreigners to gain control of domestic assets. 
The last group of  papers (Paul Healy and Krishna Palepu, and Deborah 
Swenson) investigates developments in international  M&A. The authors focus 
on both the size of cross-border flows and the price that foreigners tend to pay 
in such transactions. 
Overview Papers 
Graham and Krugman provide an overview of the late-  1980s surge in world- 
wide foreign direct investment and survey the conceptual issues that it raises. 
During the 1985-1989  period, they estimate, FDI  grew at a rate of 27 per- 
cent per year, amounting to $3.6 trillion of business assets acquired or built 
by foreign owners during that time. While Graham and Krugman discuss the 4  Kenneth A. Froot 
ambiguities in these overall numbers, all measures of FDI paint a generally 
similar story for the period. Furthermore, there is little disagreement that this 
period was characterized by the rapid emergence of Japan into the process of 
investment abroad (although not into that of investment at home), a diminution 
in the importance of U.S. FDI outflows and a shift toward the United States as 
a dominant recipient for FDI, a decline in the relative magnitude of North- 
South flows compared to North-North flows, and a dramatic shift in the nature 
of FDI away from greenfield and toward merger and acquisition. 
What do we understand about the causes and effects of this late-1980s surge 
in FDI? The first issue concerns the most fundamental determinants of FDI, 
which almost by definition involve the determinants of the boundaries of the 
firm. Perhaps the growth in the importance of  FDI may  be interpreted as a 
widening of  the boundaries of  the firm. Graham and Krugman look at two 
basic approaches for thinking about this question. The first suggests that the 
boundaries of the firm are defined by the tension between costs of transacting 
and costs of institutional rigidities. While this view is intriguing, its ability to 
predict the large increase in FDI during the 1980s seems questionable. Factors 
such as improvement in communication and information technology probably 
help improve the flexibility of large organizations and hence may help to ex- 
plain the surge in FDI. But these factors probably also help firms economize 
on arm’s length transaction costs, which predicts a tendency toward more- 
restrictive firm boundaries. 
A second view focuses on the behavior of enterprise scale rather than scope. 
For example, a firm might grow “too” big as a result of the incentives of man- 
agers (agents), which differ from those of  owners (principals). Using these 
views, Graham and Krugman go on to suggest four reasons that multinational 
enterprises might be growing: increasing integration of world markets, grow- 
ing similarity of national markets, improved communications and control tech- 
nology, and growing symmetry in international technological capabilities. 
Even if economists were in complete agreement about the factors governing 
long-run growth of multinationals, there still would be a need to explain the 
surge of FDI in the 1980s. Graham and Krugman discuss three theories that 
might help explain the timing of FDI: valuation effects, tax changes, and trade 
barriers. They stress the first (the valuation story originally discussed by Froot 
and Stein 1991), in which internally generated funds are cheaper than those 
raised externally, so that fluctuations in internal funds can help explain fluctua- 
tions in FDI. The behavior of  exchange rates and stock prices over the late 
1980s seems to help explain the surge in Japanese outward and U.S. inward 
investment. Graham and Krugman also propose that agency problems similar 
to those that U.S. savings and loans experienced during this period led to a 
more aggressive corporate attitude toward risk and to heightened levels of FDI. 
In her paper, Rachel McCulloch relates the changing role of  the United 
States in world FDI to changes in the firm-specific competitive advantages 
required for successful global expansion. McCulloch reminds us that the eco- 5  Introduction 
nomics of comparative advantage is an unrefutable force for explaining coun- 
try trade but that no similar force exists for explaining company trade. Firm- 
specific advantages and how they determine scope and scale of firm activities 
are still poorly understood. 
McCulloch considers two economywide influences on FDI: exchange rates 
and trade barriers. Exchange rate movements have a clear effect on relative 
production costs; dollar depreciation, all else equal, makes producing traded 
goods in the United States more profitable. However, low production costs do 
not necessarily guarantee inward FDI; domestic firms may be the ones to grow 
and exploit the enhanced opportunity. McCulloch argues that when exchange 
rate fluctuations  are large and unpredictable (as they were in the 1980s), multi- 
national corporations (MNCs) may  have an advantage over purely domestic 
firms because of their flexibility in shifting marginal production and sales in 
response to  exchange rate changes. Import barriers ought also to have  an 
important trade-substituting effect on FDI. However, the empirical evidence 
on the importance of trade barriers is much weaker than that for the exchange 
rate. It may be that domestic firms are better suited to take advantage of actual 
trade barriers through domestic investment. 
McCulloch also argues that one can easily put too much emphasis on the 
importance of location per se. Even if all production locations are perfect sub- 
stitutes, a firm with a good idea will expand rapidly and hence is likely to 
generate FDI. There are good reasons to think that FDI has an ambiguous 
impact on both trade, domestic employment, and industry competitiveness. 
McCulloch notes that FDI often occurs in markets which display imperfect 
competition. As in the “new” trade literature, a government may  find that it 
can exploit these imperfections to the advantage of its domestic residents. It 
can gamer more of the world’s taxable profits by encouraging the most profit- 
able companies to locate domestically (especially those that can compete most 
profitably  with  a  domestic location). McCulloch asks whether the United 
States will deviate from its former role of advocating limitless host counEry 
FDI. Now that the United States is the world’s foremost FDI host, there will 
be pressures to change this policy. 
Raymond Vernon explores the major changes in multinational corporations 
over the last forty years and then uses that history as a platform for forecasting 
future developments. Vernon first explores the reasons why U.S. firms early on 
took the multinational framework to heart. He suggests several motivations. 
The first-that  MNCs were necessary for vertical integration-was  an im- 
portant factor before World War I1 for companies involved in extracting and 
processing raw materials. With relatively few players in the business, markets 
could not be counted on, and quantity or strategically induced rationing was a 
concern. A second motivation Vernon discusses is that of “animal spirits,” in 
which presumably there is little economic gain (and perhaps some loss) for the 
foreign investment behavior of U.S. firms. Third comes the more rational de- 
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the late 1950s and the 196Os, foreign competitors gradually acquired the ability 
to compete effectively with U.S. leaders. These U.S. firms were then motivated 
to move abroad in order to better design their products for local markets and to 
avoid the protectionist pressures which can crop up when indigenous industries 
attempt to grow. Finally, firms moved abroad for purposes of risk management. 
Implicit collusion among competitors may be better facilitated if  firms pre- 
commit to having similar sources of revenues and costs. Thus, once a single 
competitor moves abroad (regardless of the reasons), other firms have an incen- 
tive to follow. 
Vernon also looks at the more recent period, in which European and Japa- 
nese firms have taken their place along with U.S. companies as innovators and 
leaders. These firms (Europeans first and now the Japanese) have experienced 
stages similar to those of U.S.  firms. Vernon argues that much of their FDI can 
be interpreted as an attempt to prevent overseas markets from being competed 
away by local enterprises. Vernon also discusses the conflicts emerging in Eu- 
rope as to whether local firms will retain their national character in the unified 
market. Japanese firms, he argues, are in an initial catch-up phase in the inter- 
nationalization of their production. It is too early to tell whether differences in 
their practices (e.g., using Japanese managers to run foreign affiliates) will 
disappear as the affiliates age. 
Vernon also speculates on the future of the MNC. He argues that past trends 
point toward continued growth in the importance of MNCs in world trade. He 
suggests that the influence of  individual governments on MNCs is on the de- 
cline, as competition among governments and the substitutability of different 
locations of production grow. 
Country Papers 
Robert Lawrence’s paper looks at FDI in Japan. He begins by  noting that 
Japanese inbound FDI is an interesting topic because there is so little of it: 
the foreign-owned share of Japanese domestic production is approximately 1 
percent of  industrial assets, compared with an average of  about 20 percent 
foreign controlled in other developed countries. Recently, net inflows of FDI 
into Japan have actually been negative. There is no sign that foreign acquisi- 
tions in the local market are picking up. 
Most of Lawrence’s chapter is devoted to examining the evidence for barri- 
ers to foreign acquisitions of Japanese firms. He argues that the low levels of 
inbound FDI point toward barriers to entry rather than toward low foreign 
demand. 
Lawrence presents several kinds of evidence that supply rather than demand 
considerations have combined to keep FDI low. First, U.S. receipts from royal- 
ties and fees paid by  unaffiliated foreigners worldwide come disproportion- 
ately from Japan. Because of high entry and market costs, foreigners choose 
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barriers to foreign entry, one would expect the percentage of majority foreign- 
owned FDI would be low and that an unusually large share of FDI would need 
to be devoted to wholesale trade. This implication seems to be borne out: the 
fraction of  U.S. FDI in  Japan that is majority owned by  a U.S. parent (34 
percent)is very low in comparison with comparable shares worldwide (76 per- 
cent). Also, the fraction of U.S. FDI in wholesale trade in Japan is unusually 
high compared to similar fractions worldwide. 
These considerations suggest that distribution and entry into the Japanese 
market are more difficult than elsewhere and that, as a result, foreigners will 
have an unusually high demand to acquire (rather than build) enterprises in 
Japan. However, foreign acquisitions in Japan remain extremely low (in abso- 
lute terms and also relative to greenfield FDI activity). Cross-shareholding 
practices by Japanese firms and rules discriminating against foreign acquirers 
seem to explain this tendency. Evidence of liberalization is lacking: in recent 
years, Japanese firms have accelerated their acquisitions of both Japanese and 
non-Japanese firms, yet  acquisitions of  Japanese firms by  foreigners have 
barely held constant. Lawrence finds that the low level of acquisitions relative 
to greenfield investment in  Japan explains almost entirely the low absolute 
amount of total FDI into Japan. Finally, he finds that keiretsu affiliations  in an 
industry have a dampening affect on FDI, even when controlling for both capi- 
tal intensity and concentration. He concludes that many of  these features of 
Japanese FDI support the conclusion that there remain substantial barriers to 
foreign entry and operation. 
Robert Lipsey’s paper studies the experience of the country that virtually 
defined FDI during most of the postwar period, the United States. Indeed, until 
the mid-l970s, the United States was responsible for more than half of  the 
world’s FDI outflows and owned more than half of the developed world’s stock 
of direct investment. Only one other country accounted for more than 6 percent 
of the world’s stock of FDI (the United Kingdom) with about 16 percent). On 
the inflow side, the United States absorbed on average only about 10 percent 
of  inflows to developed countries through the mid-1960s. World FDI was 
pretty well characterized as the move of U.S.  companies to produce abroad. 
By the mid-l980s, of  course, these figures had changed dramatically. U.S. 
outflows had fallen to about 15 percent of world FDI; at the same time, inflows 
into the United States accounted for 46 percent of world flows. By  1990, the 
FDI stock in the United States had already risen to a level about as large as the 
stock of  U.S. FDI abroad. Lipsey argues that while these numbers overstate 
the relative size of  the FDI stock in the United States (assets are carried at 
historical cost, which tends to understate the value of  relatively older U.S. 
assets held abroad), they nonetheless provide a rough gauge for how rapidly 
foreign ownership in the United States has grown. 
Lipsey shows that growth of foreign ownership has been particularly rapid 
in manufacturing, where the  FDI stock has quadrupled over the past fifteen 
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increase was led by  the Japanese, who went from insignificant owners to the 
second-largest  investor in the United States (after the British), accounting for 
20 percent of the stock of U.S. FDI. 
Lipsey points to another important change in inbound FDI: the means by 
which it is financed. Over half of the investment which took place in the 1950s 
and 1960s was financed through retained earnings. By the 1980s, this fraction 
had dropped to almost zero. It is well known that this increase was at least 
partly due to the increased viability of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
What is less well known is that the profitability of  foreign affiliates in  the 
United States declined dramatically in the 1980s, so that foreign investors had 
little to retain. These low returns may reflect increases in affiliates’ financial 
leverage andor poorer choices of investment targets. 
Louis Wells focuses on an important recent trend in world FDI, done by 
companies he calls “mobile exporters.” Typically these are companies from 
relatively high-income developing countries seeking low-cost installations to 
access third-country markets. The rate of growth of mobile-export FDI in some 
developing countries is quite astonishing. Wells takes Indonesia as his primary 
example. There the FDI approved during the 1987-90  period is 150 percent of 
aZZ  the FDI which occurred in that country from 1967 to 1987. The lion’s share 
of this growth is associated with an increase in the role of export-oriented FDI 
from other developing countries. For instance, from 1977 to 1985, the share of 
FDI into Indonesia that came from developing countries was only 6 percent. 
During this period, Japanese investment dominated. By the first half of  1991, 
however, other East Asian developing countries  alone accounted for 56 percent 
of projects approved for FDI (in manufacturing alone, the fraction rises to 65 
percent). Wells points out that while the Japanese are widely thought of  as 
dominating FDI in Southeast Asia, other developing countries in the region 
have in fact invested 3.5 times as much in Indonesia. 
Wells identifies three major rounds of  developing-country to developing- 
country FDI. The first round was  also export oriented, driven by  the desire 
to avoid import quotas in third-country markets (common industries included 
textiles and shoes). The second round consisted of  trade-substituting FDI- 
developing-country companies came to Indonesia fearing that present or future 
trade barriers would block their access to Indonesia’s domestic markets. The 
third round has come from companies seeking lower-cost export bases for their 
products. Firms from South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong have 
faced currency appreciations, wage increases, and labor shortages. They have 
chosen Indonesia and Thailand over other low-cost locations such as Africa or 
other local developing countries (such as Vietnam, China, and the Philippines). 
Ease of  doing business, input access, tax considerations, and assurances of 
property rights seem to promote investment when the investor is searching for 
a low-cost location. Wells suggests that countries such as Mexico are increas- 
ingly  suitable hosts; he  cites political considerations as well  as Mexico’s 
strengthening access to U.S. markets. 9  Introduction 
Industry Studies 
David Yoffie investigates FDI in the semiconductor industry. Semiconduc- 
tors are perhaps the world’s most highly tradable manufactured product. Yoffie 
distinguishes three “waves” of FDI in semiconductors. In the first wave, which 
took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s, firms (most U.S.-based) moved 
assembly and test functions (the relatively labor-intensive portion of produc- 
tion) to take advantage of low overseas wage costs. Also during this time, U.S. 
firms  invested  in  foreign  fabrication facilities  in  order  to  avoid  existing 
and likely future trade restrictions. Thus, the first wave included both trade- 
complementing and trade-substituting FDI. 
During the mid-l970s, a second wave of FDI began. The mode shifted from 
greenfield investment by U.S. firms to mergers and acquisitions 0fU.S.  firms. 
The motivation for this change was the need for technology transfer to another 
generation of both U.S. and non-U.S. firms.These firms were more capable of 
expending the large amounts of money needed to innovate in the face of the 
industry’s rising capital intensity and scale economies. Indeed, as the labor 
share in costs plummeted, a motivation behind the first wave of FDI was under- 
mined. 
The third and most recent wave of FDI in semiconductors became prevalent 
around the time that the boom in U.S. mergers and acquisitions subsided. (The 
watershed event was the political intervention that blocked the purchase of 
Fairchild Semiconductor by Fujitsu.) This wave is a continuation of the first- 
active greenfield investment in fabrication facilities-but  the investment is 
now being undertaken in Europe and the United States by firms from all three 
major country blocks (the United States, Europe, and Japan). Investment in 
Japan by non-Japanese companies is noticeably absent, reinforcing the trend 
which emerges in the macrodata. The third wave is distinguished from the first 
in that labor costs have become less important than other factors (tax breaks, 
local infrastructure, etc.). 
In describing these waves,  Yoffie  notes three features which appear puz- 
zling. The first is that history in location choice seems to matter, especially in 
the third wave. The increased capital intensity of ail phases of production has 
made labor costs essentially irrelevant, yet new, trade-enhacing investment in- 
flows continue in countries with low labor costs. This pattern suggests that 
accumulated knowledge or other specific factors at the plant or affiliate level 
are important economically. Second, new greenfield investments have not fol- 
lowed the Silicon Valley  model, in  which firms choose to invest near one 
another. Any  agglomeration effects or  externalities in  the production and 
testing processes must therefore be difficult to realize across firms. Third, 
both  greenfield and  investment  and  acquisition  activity  in  Japan  remain 
limited,  even  though  formal restrictions have  been  removed.  Of  the  FDI 
that does take place, most comes in the form of joint ventures with Japanese 
partners. 10  Kenneth A. Froot 
Investigations of Mergers and Acquisitions 
Paul Healy and Krishna Palepu examine international mergers and acquisi- 
tions among eleven major industrialized  countries for the period 1985 to 1990. 
These cross-border M&A deals account for fully 30 percent of all cross-border 
equity purchases (direct plus portfolio investment). The worldwide patterns are 
similar to those seen in balance-of-payments measures of FDI  (of which cross- 
border M&A is but one component): the United States now  accounts for a 
large portion of  world inflows, with over 60 percent on average during the 
period; Japan’s foreign acquisitions account for 14 percent of such flows over 
the period, with a large increase in the final few years; foreign acquisitions 
done in Japan are essentially zero over the period; the United Kingdom is the 
most active acquirer nation (controlling 26  percent of  world M&A expendi- 
tures) and also one of the most aggressive; and Spain appears to have witnessed 
rapid growth in inflows (as has Europe overall) during the sample period. 
Healy and Palepu look at two possible determinants of  the level of  cross- 
border M&A: the regulation of  intercorporate investments, and the typical 
ownership structure of corporations.  The authors find that regulations of inter- 
corporate  investment (particularly those regulations which discriminate  against 
foreigners) reduce cross-border flows. For example, Australia, France, Swe- 
den, and Japan (Japan requires government notification and approval) all have 
relatively low  levels of  international M&A and  restrictions on foreign in- 
vestment. 
The authors also examine some possible determinants of the recent changes 
in cross-border acquisitions. These changes do not appear to be explained well 
by  regulation and ownership structure, which evolve only slowly over time. 
Healy and Palepu find little explanatory power in lagged real exchange rate 
changes, changes in economic growth in the target and acquirer countries, and 
changes in the level of domestic M&A activity in the target country. Only the 
latter of  these factors is significant. The importance of  changes in domestic 
M&A for explaining changes in international  M&A suggests that some under- 
lying causes-changes  in the technology of doing acquisitions (such as in the 
United States in the late 1980s)  or changes in the strategic importance of large 
scale operations in a country (such as Spain at the end of the 1980s)-may  be 
driving both. 
Deborah Swenson explores foreign-led  mergers and acquisitions  which took 
place in  the United States between  1974 and  1990. She finds that foreign 
M&A activity in the United States has risen even faster than inward FDI and 
that it has become the most common form of FDI in the United States. Japan 
is the country which seems to do the least amount of acquisition (versus green- 
field) FDI, although recently its acquisition share has risen dramatically.  Swen- 
son reports evidence that only a small fraction of foreign acquisitions can be 
explained by  domestic M&A  activity. Thus, domestic acquisitions, which 11  Introduction 
Healy and Palepu find useful for understanding cross-border  M&A in the cross 
section, are not particularly useful for understanding foreign M&A over time. 
Swenson also investigates a  number of  specific features of  foreign-led 
M&A in the United States. She finds that, in acquiring U.S. companies, a for- 
eigner tends to pay a premium of about 10 percent over what is typically paid 
when another U.S. company is the acquirer. This price differential remains 
when one controls for variables that have been found to influence the premium 
paid in domestic acquisitions  (i.e., the method of payment, the degree of indus- 
try concentration,  and the presence of government or target-management resis- 
tance). 
The premium paid by foreigners has other interesting features. For example, 
foreigners tend to purchase firms with higher growth potential (as measured 
by  price-earnings ratios) than domestics. When mounting an acquisition, for- 
eigners are considerably less likely to face competition from other bidding 
firms or challenges from government agencies than are domestics. In addition, 
it appears that the premiums paid on foreign acquisitions are highly sensitive 
to the exchange rate (premiums paid by  domestic acquirers are not exchange 
rate sensitive) and to foreign stock prices. This may be evidence to support 
theories of FDI that rely on wealth effects generated by imperfections in capi- 
tal markets. 
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